This paper presents Robert Gallman's classic, but heretofore unpublished annual series for US national product over the 1834-59 and 1869-1909 2 Over the next three decades, Gallman continued to refine and elaborate his value added and final flow estimates as part of a long-term project on capital formation and national product.
value for other scholarly endeavors. To prevent their misuse, I ask that those using the series presented in this paper include the following statement in their citation: "These data were not constructed for analysis as annual series." This paper has the following form. The first section introduces Gallman's annual series and documents why these figures, among those in Gallman's files, are his most "finished" product. It also notes and provides corrections for several minor errors in the circulated series. The second and third sections discuss Gallman's efforts to construct and further develop the Volume 30 series. The fourth sector lays out the limitations on their usefulness for business-cycle analysis while the fifth section compares the Volume 30 estimates to other available pre-1909 series for GNP and the implicit price deflator.
Gallman's work on extensions and promising areas for future research are explored in the sixth section. The seventh section concludes.
I. The Annual Series
Contrary to conventional practice, this paper offers the soup before the sermon. Table 1 and 2 show Gallman's annual series in constant 1860 prices for national product and its major spending sub-components over the 1834-1859 and 1869-1909 periods, respectively. The 1834-59 series are for census years -that is, 1839 refers to 1 June 1839 to 31 May 1840 -and those for 1869-1909 are for calendar years.
5 Table 2 also includes Gallman's newer (1990s) estimates of annual changes in inventories for the period and reports on various corrections to the post-bellum real product series. Table 3 displays Gallman's series on annual national product and its major spending subcomponents over the 1869-1909 period in current prices. Gallman did not develop annual current-value national product series for the ante-bellum period in Volume 30 because the relevant price deflators were available only intermittently. 6 Because Gallman made a Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets and International Capital Flows: Britain, the Americas, and, Australia, 1865 -1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001 . 5 Gallman generally believed that as decadal averages the "estimates for the latter years are more reliable than those for the earlier years." Notes for Tables A-2 and A-3 of his Volume 30 article provide current-value estimates, broken down by major spending category, for the years 1839, 1844, 1849, 1854, and 1859. number of revisions over time, the series reported in this paper differ somewhat from those underlying the published decadal averages. Nonetheless, I will follow Gallman's practice of referring to these numbers as the "Volume 30 series."
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The data in Table 1 are, with Gallman's minor revisions, fundamentally the same as those underlying the overlapping decennial series published in his 1966 article in
Volume 30 of Studies of Income and Wealth. The differences resulted from (1) small discrepancies in rounding and (2) small revisions to the estimates for manufactured producer durables in the post-bellum period, especially for 1884-1903 period.
8
Apart from the inventory investment estimates, the figures using the 1860 prices are from a typeset mimeograph found in Gallman's files dated June 1965 with "MasterFinal Version" penciled in his hand. 9 We have several solid pieces of evidence that
Gallman considered these series his most "finished." First, he was using these spreadsheets as the basis for his work on national product and capital formation in the In 1985, Gallman had his research assistant, Mike Butler, create annual current-value product estimates for the ante-bellum period using the current-price benchmarks, the constant-value product interpolators, and relevant series from the Warren-Pearson wholesale price indices. Gallman apparently intended to use these data in his work estimating the capital stock using the perpetual inventory approach. When the trend in the Warren-Pearson prices differed in sign for that of the price benchmarks (e.g. for several categories of commodities during the 1849-54 period) they used straight-line interpolation. I do not judge these series to represent Gallman's "finished product" and do not report them. 7 There is another set of series in Gallman's notes including constant 1929-price values for the period. These series appear to represent Gallman's revisions of Kuznets' series, which he used for intepolation among other purposes. Because Gallman does not treat this series as his own creation, I have chosen not to include them. 8 Gallman revised his post-bellum manufactured producer durable series between the preparation of the Volume 30 paper for publication and June 1965. The June 1967 spreadsheets note that manufactured producer durables "may be slightly different from the series underlying Vol. 30." During the 1990s, Gallman was apparently unable to locate the exact spreadsheets used in the Volume 30 tables. In a 21 Jan. 1994 letter to Richard Sutch, Gallman recounted having "a dim recollection of making minor changes of this cost (of manufacturing durables) after the Vol. 30 paper was in press." Similarly on 15 Aug. 1995, Gallman wrote to Benjamin Friedman that "The series I am sending you differ slightly, but only slightly--from those that figure in the Volume 30 paper. While spreadsheets exist that perform some of the interpolations used in the new series, I have not found anything fully documenting the changes. It is likely that they were the result of Gallman's creation of new benchmarks using better price series. One extant set of spreadsheets in the manufacturers producer durable files contains the notes "price data... found after conf(erence) paper series completed." Gallman papers. The errors were not offset by corresponding errors in the series on "all other construction" and, as a result, carry through to Gallman's total construction, capital formation, and GNP estimates for these years. There is some evidence that Gallman found the movements of the railroad series suspicious because there is a check next to the numbers. As noted below, Gallman produced in 1994 a new set of railroad construction estimates that avoid these problems entirely.
18 In addition to minor typos, I found an inconsistency in the current-price inventory estimates for livestock over the 1869-79 period. To deflate the value of production of perishables, semi-perishables, consumer durables, and manufactured producers' durables, Gallman used detailed information on commodity flows from Shaw and his own Volume 24 piece and on prices from Brady to create benchmark estimates for 1869, 1879, 1889, and 1899 using 1860 prices. He then employed the yearly variations in the corresponding Kuznets constant 1929-price annual series to interpolate between the benchmarks. The 1900-09 figures were simply extrapolated based on the Kuznets series. Simon Kuznets published his series on national product and its sub-components only as 5-year moving averages.
for the years 1834, 1836, 1839, 1844, 1849, 1854, and 1859; (2) adding estimates for the value of services based largely on capital stock series; 22 and (3) interpolating the series in the intervening years using scattered annual data on numerous economic activities. The appendix of Volume 30 extensively documents the procedures employed. The "major" benchmarks (1839, 1849, and 1859) were primarily based on materials from the US census whereas the "minor" benchmarks (1834, 1836, 1844, and 1854) used several state censuses. The benchmarks for commodity production relied primarily on the sectoral value added data described in Gallman's Volume 24 Studies in Income and Wealth article.
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There were only small adjustments and shifts of commodity production between categories.
Two points deserve our attention here. The first is that these series incorporated the most up-to-date data available in the early 1960s. In his acknowledgements for the Second, the annual national product series between the benchmark years are interpolated or extrapolated using a less comprehensive set of products. The main issue
is not the number of series used-for his ante-bellum estimates, Gallman employed data on over thirty commodities drawn from an amazing array of primary and secondary 22 Gallman's method of estimating service flows in the ante-bellum period differed substantially from that used in the post-bellum period. For the 1869-1909 period, he followed the procedure of Kuznets who used budget studies to derive the ratio of consumer expenditures on services relative to commodities and then multiplying the commodity flow series by this ratio. Volume 30, p. 37. For the ante-bellum period, Gallman built up service flows primarily from capital stock estimates, particularly on the value of housing. 23 "Commodity Output, 1839-1899."
sources-but how representative their movements are.
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Regarding his use of interpolators and extrapolators, Gallman noted in Volume 30 that the statistics on net imports "receive relatively too much weight," industrial equipment is "inadequately represented," many of the major groups rely on one or a few underlying series, and that the flow of materials into production (e.g. wheat, corn, raw cotton and wool, and lumber) tended to dominate the series. He adds, lest these warnings "raise too many doubts, bear in mind that the interpolations and extrapolations generally carry over only four years, and frequently fewer years than this. The estimates produced are only used in decade averages... to reduce our dependence on benchmark year estimates to establish prewar levels of performance."
25
The main point is that these interpolation/extrapolation procedures are useful for determining long-run trends, but as Gallman noted, problematic for analyzing businesscycle fluctuations. 26 This is especially true for investigations of the changing volatility of the macro-economy or for comparison of one specific cycle with another. And this message carries double weight for analyses contrasting the behavior of the ante-bellum and post-bellum series, which at the detailed level are constructed in meaningfully different ways. One key difference is how non-commodity production is estimated. As
Gallman was keenly aware, the results of business-cycle analysis on the annual Volume 30 data would depend more on artifact as fact.
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24 In particular, see the long Table A-10 in "Gross National Product." 25 "Gross National Product," pp. 64-71. 26 In a world with high compound growth rates, the use of straight-line interpolation also introduces biases in the timing of the expansion. The direction of the bias depends on whether the interpolator series grows faster or slower than the benchmark series. 27 For these reasons, Gallman was generally opposed to work using his annual national product series to compare the volatility of nineteenth and twentieth century business cycles. But he also took strong issue with claims that his procedures to estimate non-commodity production over the 1839-59 period were "flawed" and generated excessively volatile series. In his view, any bias in volatility due to his construction procedure was likely to be weak or work in opposite direction from what is usually suggested. The ante-bellum series were not constructed using the Kuznets' ratio-method to estimate service flows, but rather using the growth of housing stocks, which was far smoother. Note services accounted for about 24 percent of Gallman's real value estimate of national product (excluding changes in inventories) over the 1834-59 period. In addition, the estimates for firewood production, which accounted for about 6 percent of national product, relied on straight-line interpolation. One offsetting force was the interpolation using net imports, which tended to "oscillate fairly widely" over the 1834-42 period (p.64). But as p. 71 notes, he "attempted to dilute the effect of these oscillations by bringing the leather series into the interpolator." Clearly, the volatility displayed in the annual series was the product of explicit, conscious data collection and assembly choices.
III. Gallman's Subsequent Use of the Volume 30 Series
From the mid-1960s on, Robert Gallman produced a long stream of articles--often in collaboration with Lance Davis, Edward Howle, or Thomas Weiss--that further developed and analyzed the Volume 30 national product estimates (see Table 4 Of all the estimates, the poorest are those of the value of services flowing to consumers. We do not know what margin for error to assign to these figures. If they are in error, the chances are that they are too high. Services account for roughly one-quarter of GNP in the prewar years. Consequently, an error as large as 20 per cent in the service component would throw GNP off by only 5 per cent.
Around 1966, Gallman began working with Thomas Weiss to create new estimates on non-commodity production. These efforts led to the estimates of the value added of the service sector measured at the census years from 1839 to 1899 reported in Volume 34 of the Studies in Income and Wealth.
33 Given that the new series used data from a far more comprehensive collection of service activities, Gallman and Weiss regarded the Volume 34 estimates as "stronger" (p. 290) that those derived from the Volume 30 statistics. As
Gallman had anticipated, the new series was 5-18 percent lower than the Volume 30 current-price series for the "service" sector over the 1839-79 period and about 10 percent higher over the 1889-1899 period. Consequently, the growth rate of service output as revealed by the new series was faster than shown in the old, especially over the late nineteenth century. Although the subsequent articles built on the Volume 30 product series, the revisions were generally not incorporated in the annual estimates. That is, the changes were made as adjustments to the decadal averages rather than as revisions to the underlying series. But I hope this discussion also makes it plain that the Volume 30 series form the core part of our best estimates of US GNP, NNP, and capital formation before 1909. Thus they underlie much of what we "know" about nineteenth-century American growth.
IV. Limitations on the Uses of the Estimates
During his long career, Gallman circulated his unpublished Volume 30 series to other scholars, but they always came with a warning. As a 1963 mimeo put it, "NOTE: were never published in annual form.
In an important sense, Gallman's objective in creating his annual series was exactly the opposite of business-cycle analysis. He wanted to control for short-run fluctuations so they would not cloud our assessment of longer-run economic performance. Simple comparisons of the benchmark estimates, available only on a five or ten-year basis, risked comparing peaks with troughs. Table 5 provides a better sense of differences resulting from using the benchmark estimates and the decadal averages.
As it shows, especially in the ante-bellum period, the growth rates calculated over the 37 "Chapter 3: Appendix U.S. Estimates of National Product" in Evolving Financial Markets pp. 342-344. Also see "Notes for the File on National Accounts, " Gallman papers. Gallman is presumably referring to Kuznets' T-tables. Kuznets observed that "the series available as annual interpolators were most frequently the more sensitive indexes and would yield annual series exaggerating the short-term changes." His annual gross product estimates "would not be acceptable measures of the amplitude of short-term changes" and, therefore, "are not shown." Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy, Its Formation and Financing (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961) decadal averages are less volatile than those based on comparisons of the single-year benchmarks.
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V. Comparisons with Other Estimates
To assess the Volume 30 series more fully, it is useful to compare them with the other available annual series. This is rather easily done for the ante-bellum period because the only other annual series in general circulation are Thomas Berry's.
(Actually, Berry authored several series; I focus on his 1978 and 1988 versions.) 41 He constructed income estimates for the 1789-1889 period using regression analysis and back-projection. Basically, he found a number of long time-series of economic variables extending from the time when reliable national product estimate exist back into the earlier "statistical dark age." Berry empirically estimated the relationship between these variables and the national product series during the period of overlap and then used these coefficients to back-cast the product series for the earlier period. This procedure is problematic if these relationships shift over time, that is, if as almost every observer attests, the US economy experienced significant structural change over this period.
Given that Gallman's national product estimates over the 1834-59 period are based on a firmer empirical foundation than Berry's numbers, this comparison is best viewed as a test of Berry. The contrast between the ante-bellum and post-bellum periods is largely the result of using benchmarks every five years in the early period and every ten years in the later period. It also helps that few of postbellum benchmark years coincided with peaks or troughs of the business cycle. to Kuznets' series and made further changes which affected the cyclical movements of the series rather than its general trend. Romer used regression analysis to replace Kuznets's less formal procedure for establishing the relationship between commodity production and the output of the service sector. Balke-Gordon also used regression analysis, in a different form, to estimate non-commodity production. In addition, they developed new interpolators for the construction, transportation, and communications sectors and constructed new annual deflators, based on movements in consumer prices.
Comparing his series with the newcomers, Gallman concluded that the three series "differ chiefly in the methods used to estimate non-commodity production, and the 42 There is internal evidence in Gallman's files that he and his research assistants made such comparisons themselves. "Gallman vs. Berry" file, Gallman paper. 
VI. Extensions and Promising Areas for Future Research
Gallman considered the annual estimates of nineteenth century US national product, which he made in the 1960s, "incomplete" and he worked over the subsequent decades to make improvements. A memo from 20 May 1985 highlighted the following limitations with the Volume 30 national product series:
44 "Notes for the File on National Accounts" pp. 7-8, Gallman papers. 45 Gallman did not create any current-value estimates for the 1834-59 period that should be consider "finished work," so no implicit price deflators exist for the ante-bellum period. The revisions changed real GNP by more than the rounding error only in 1834 and 1838, as indicated by underlining. "Note on the Adjustment of Canal Construction Estimates" Gallman papers. 53 Sutch to Gallman, 26 Sept. and 19 Nov. 1993; Gallman to Sutch, 14 and 21 Jan. 1994. components, Gallman used Ulmer's estimates of gross capital expenditures (excluding land) by steam railroads and then subtracted estimates of equipment spending based on Shaw's output data to derive his series of annual gross investment for railroad construction.
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This procedure apparently yielded negative residuals in the 1896-98 period, leading Gallman to replace these estimates with the zeros shown in the Table. (As noted above, the original series also contain errors resulting from misplacing the decimal point during the 1875-77 period.) As Figure 5 illustrates, the timing of the original residual-based series is poorly correlated with numbers of mileage constructed available from Railway Age. Gallman did create some GNP series using the revised figures, it is questionable whether these data should be considered a "finished product." From personal conversations, I
know that Gallman believed that re-estimating railroad investment was a highly fruitful subject for future research. For the convenience of those who would prefer to use the revised series (and avoid the obvious problems inherent in the original railroad series), I
have included Gallman's 1994/96 revisions for railroad construction in Table 2 . Again, the effects on the annual GNP estimates are small. movements of the implicit price deflators displayed in Figure 4 highlight the importance of treating prices with care.
Another area that seems ripe for reconsideration is the estimation of the product of the service sector, especially for the ante-bellum period. As noted above, the estimation of non-commodity production and its impact on measured volatility figure prominently in the debates between Romer, Balke-Gordon, and others. Moreover, Gallman considered the service sector estimates for the antebellum sector the weakest in the series and worked with Thomas Weiss to improve the benchmark estimates in their Volume 34 paper. The Volume 34 decadal estimates, which include data on distribution, transportation, public utilities, banking, insurance, professional and personal services, education, government, and housing, could usefully serve as benchmarks for more comprehensive interpolations and extrapolations than those conducted to estimate the service flows in Volume 30.
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A further area that warrants further examination is the estimation of inventory changes over the 1870-1909 period. During the 1990s, Gallman endeavored to supplement his decadal inventory estimates with annual figures (see below). By differencing the inventory stocks, Gallman formed estimates of annual inventory investment, which he added to his Volume 30 series to create a GNP series closer to the conventional definition. The work to estimate inventory levels was conducted, principally by his research assistants, in the mid-1990s and has not been subject to the same scrutiny as the Volume 30 numbers.
The common practice of presenting real GNP, nominal GNP, and the implicit price deflator as separate columns in tables misstates their interdependence. Obviously any two aggregate series yields the third, but the procedures used to the aggregates typically involve combinations of all three. That is, for some components, price indices and quantities are multiplied to derive values; for others, quantities are estimated from values divided by a price series; and for still others, implicit prices are derived from values divided by quantities. This implies that decisions about the price concepts must be made in the process of generating the real product series. 58 My understanding of the procedure used to derive the ante-bellum service flows is as follows: Gallman had estimates for the 1869 value of services in 1860 prices and three extrapolating series: (a) the value of churches (available in 1870 and 1860); (b) the value of tax receipts of state and local governments (running back to 1849); and (c) the value of residential housing (with existing estimates available back to 1850 and Gallman's extrapolation to 1840). He first converted all of the extrapolators into 1860 dollars and then uses all three to estimate the 1859 benchmark from the 1869 value. Then he used real values of (b) and (c) to derive the 1849 benchmark and finally (c) alone to calculate the 1839 benchmarks. To interpolate between the 1839, 1849, and 1859 levels, Gallman employed Gottlieb's estimates of the stock of residential housing (which must be a fairly smooth series) and to extrapolate back of 1839, he used his lumber series (pp. 57-60, 63-64 ).
An additional concern centers on how the inventory stocks were estimated. They were estimated separately the stocks of animals (cattle, swine, sheep, horses, and mules) and of other goods (imported goods, crops, mined and manufactured goods). The procedure for estimating inventories of other goods followed "one employed by Kuznets (National Product Since 1869 , 1946 ) (where) inventories were taken as a fixed fraction of the value of imports and the value of outputs of the agricultural, manufacturing, and mining sectors."
59 Note that this procedure, while reasonable over long periods, builds properties into the high-frequency time-series that may be misleading. Specifically, it assumes that the relationship between production and inventory accumulation does not vary over the business cycle.
Also note that if the ratios translating output into inventories fail to capture the effects of improvements in transportation and communications or organizational changes (such as the rise of modern business enterprise), these inventory figures may paint misleading picture of secular growth. As the Volume 30 paper observed that:
"Kuznets' estimates of changes in inventories are, in considerable measure, extrapolations on rates of change of output. Since we have altered these rates of change, the inventory figures should be adjusted. But Kuznets himself has limited confidence in the procedures he used. Application of these procedures to pre-Civil War data would appear to be even more dubious, but no other method is presently available. Consequently, we decided to leave this component out of both the pre-and post-Civil War series" 60 I leave it to others to judge whether to include or exclude the recently added series on annual inventory changes. This discussion serves to highlight that assembling and analyzing data on the evolution of inventory-output relationships over the nineteenth century is a potentially high-value area for future research.
Finally, Gallman made a number of estimates of the value of non-conventional output, including the value of improvements to farmland and of home production activities. To evaluate economic performance over the nineteenth century requires paying full attention to these important activities and to the shifts between market and non-market production.
59 "American Economic Growth before the Civil War," p. 109.
VII. Concluding Remarks
The Volume 30 series were the product of decades of painstaking labor and careful judgment by one of the best scholars ever to work in the field of American economic history. They form a key part of our best estimates of nineteenth-century US GNP, NNP, and capital formation and thus underlie much of what we know about America's economic growth. In his modest, scholarly way, Robert Gallman wanted to make his Volume 30 estimates better before releasing them to the world. Even without all the improvements he hoped to make, they remain among the best numbers we have for this period. Gallman worried that making his annual series available would only encourage their further misuse by business-cycle analysts, which angered him greatly.
Again to address this concern, I ask that those using the series presented in this paper include the following statement in their citation: "These data were not constructed for analysis as annual series." 
